Seeing the Light and Hearing the Call: The Aesthetics of Knowledge and Thought by Celermajer, Danielle
Seeing the Light and Hearing the
Call; the Aesthetics of Knowledge
and Thought
Danlelle CelermaJer
Kafka listened to tradition, and he who listens hard, does not see.
Walter Benjamin, Some Reflections of Kafka
When, with our mind's eye, we followed Socrates from the obscurity
of the cave out into the clarity of the sun's light, we inherited a
metaphoric world of knowing that remains deeply woven into the
fabric of Western thought and language. The truth of Hannah
Arendt's observation that, "from the outset in formal philosophy,
thinking has been thought of in terms of seeing"1 is evidenced by the
ubiquitous presence of visual metaphors throughout our language.
If you look at how you think about your own cognitive processes,
you might see what I mean; but if you remain in the dark, this article
should elucidate the claim. Although obvious once pointed out, the
dominance of sight in the Greek way of thinking is so pervasive that
it has entered the category of the invisible conditions of thought.
A number of thinkers have pointed out both the distinctly
Athenian roots of vision's dominance in our models of thought, and
the existence of another, parallel metaphoric world of knowing: the
hearing of the Jews.2 In his classic comparative text on Hebrew and
Greek modes of thought, ThorIief Boman tracks this difference and
I Hannah Arendt, "Thinking" in TI,e Life oj ti,e Mind, Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich 1978, p.
110.
2 See for example Gershom Scholem, 0" ti,e Kabbalah lind its symbolism Shocken, 1996; David
Banon, L" /.eclure inJinie: I.es Voies de rilltrpretation midracl.iqlle (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1987,
Marelene Zarader, The UntilOught Debt; Heidegger and the Hebraic Heritage, pp. 75-76; Bultmann,
"The Word of God in the New Testament" in Faith IIIllI Understanding I, Translated by Loiuse
Pettibone Smith, London: SCM Press, 1969.
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then links the two modalities of access to truth or '''Yhat is' with the
other key differences in the two traditions, such as their
understanding of the nature of reality, their relative emphases on
space and time and the epistemological status they accord emotion
and reason. Put pithily, the Greek modality of vision is correlated
with a static worldview favouring objectivity and spatial
dominance, whereas the Hebrew modality of sound leads us to a
dynamic, fluid world in which the knower is always already
intimately and emotionally embedded.
This distinction is not of mere historical interest, but a way into
recognising implicit qualities of our own epistemological and
ontological preferences. To draw our attention to those implicit
assumptions, as he leads us through the comparison, Boman
continually remarks on the ease with which we (the modern
Western reader) will grasp the Greek, whereas the Hebrew
framework frequently strikes us as inconsistent, incomprehensible
or perhaps vulgar.3 Recognising this inclination, the first part of
Boman's project is to cast doubt on our conflation of one modality of
thought with pre-modern irrationalism and the other with reason's
triumph. From here, his second move is to challenge our assumption
that the two can be mapped across a progressive history where we
stand at the top with Socrates, in the sun. As an alternative to this
competitive structure, Boman invites us to regard the two
modalities of knowledge in the same way as Niels Bohr regarded
the wave and particle dimensions of atomic physics, that is, as
"complementary", each necessary to form a complete relationship
with the world, even as their simultaneous veracity amounts to a
logical impossibility.
3 Thus, Boman frequently opens or closes discussions with phrases like: "It is hardly necessary
to demonstrate that Greek thinking is of the logical sort ... taking into consideration what is
otherwise familiar to us. It is considerably more necessary to penetrate the peculiarity of
Israelite thinking first bc'Cause [it is] more foreign to us ... and second because the singular
value of Israelite thinking is misconstrued by most scholars and mistaken for primitive thinking
as if it was prelogicaJ." Thorleif Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, London and New
York: W. W. Norton, 1954, p. 195. Recognising this bias, he notes that when the Greek
paradigm is held as the ideal, Hebrew thinking appears "exaggerated, immoderate, discordant
and in bad taste". p. 27
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For Hans Jonas, however, who conducted the first close
phenomenological analysis of the difference between sight and
hearing as modalities of knowing, there can be no such equanimity
of judgment. Similarly, drawing on Jonas, but also mapping the
differences across Athens and Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt concludes
that sight, the noble sense, emerges the clear winner"as the guiding
metaphor and model of the thinking mind".4 Moreover, for Arendt,
the fading of an auditory path to truth in Western representations
has not been the result of an innocent, or natural withering away,
but rather represents a victory of Athens over Jerusalem.
Intriguingly, Arendt cites Philo of Alexandria as the earliest martial
of this battle, a Jew who tried to mediate the Jewish and Greek
dimensions of his identity, just as Arendt did the Jewish and
German ones of hers. Both did so, moreover, in contexts where the
non-Jewish dimension was held as the location of higher thought or
philosophy (Athens and Frieburg) and the Jewish dimension
brought them into the belly of radical anti-Semitic violence. Also a
student of the Greek (become German), Arendt follows faithfully in
Philo's footsteps, reiterating his attempt to reconcile the Hebrew and
Greek traditions by interpreting the former as "a mere preparation
for the latter, to be achieved by a divine intervention that made
man's ears into eyes to permit greater perfection of human
cognition" .5
And yet, despite the apparent certainty of her verdict in the one
text explicitly dedicated to understanding how metaphors of the
ineffable shed light on the nature of thinking, a broader reading of
Arendt's work suggests that she was far more circumspect about
vision's unambiguous benefits. For elsewhere in her work it is the
equation of truth with eternity, which she associates in this text with
the visual modality, that she blames for the monological and
totalitarian tendencies of metaphysics and its structural incapacity
4 Arendt. "Thinking" 01'. cit. p. 111; The key text for Jonas' close phenomenological analysis is
"The Nobility of Sight: A Study in the Phenomenology of the senses" in The P/,enomenoll of Life,
Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1996. pp. 135-152.
5 Arendt, ibid. p. 111.
Literatllre & Aestlretics 16(2) December 2006, page 122
Danielle Celermajer: Seeing ti,e Light and Hearing tIle Call
to admit politics and plurality as noble expressions of humanity.6
Picking up on Arendt's implicit ambivalence, this article draws on
Boman's philological and Jonas' phenomenological analyses to
explore the implications of these different metaphoric approaches to
knowing and thinking. In particular, it asks, as Arendt does when
she links the activity of thinking with the commission or prevention
of evil, if the differing aesthetics of thinking may have different
ethical implications.?
Seeing with the Greeks and Hearing with the Hebrews
Before probing their implications, let us set the stage with a sketch
of the dominant representation of these two sense modalities of
thought.s To begin etymologically, Boman, following Bruno Snell,
notes that the various Ancient Greek words for knowledge have as
their stem, oro, 'see', or are otherwise related to the visual faculty.9
Thus, Plato, the representative thinker is "a man of sight"; his
thinking is "a thinking with eyes", and it leads to the highest form of
seeing, theoria. 1O From here it follows that the Greeks understood the
goal of this process of thought or contemplation, that is truth, as
"that which is unveiled", made evident or brought into clear sight.
Such visual dominance at the level of process and product is most
striking in Plato's doctrine of ideas, but it is more generally apparent
6 To this end, she quotes Jonas from '"The Nobility of Sight'" cited above, '"Only sight therefore
provides the sensual basis on which the mind may conceive the idea of the eternal, that which
never changes and is always present.'" op. cit. p. 112. She develops her criticism of the eternal in
Tile 1111 man COlldition, University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp. 17-21.
7 Sec in particular Introduction to TIle Life of tile Mind, up. cit.
S The polarisation of the two approaches or modalities of thought as presented here is
overdrawn and perhaps even caricatured. This absolute division is preserved in a fairly faithful
reading of Boman's analysis, not because it is a correct portrayal of Jewish and Greek thought ill
toto, but rather because an ideal type presentation clearly portrays two tendencies in thought.
Indeed it is on this point that Boman's work, along with similar dichotomous depictions like
Lev Shestov's Atllens alld [e",salem have been criticised. Recognising the importance of such
deconstructive criticisms, the ultimate object of this work is to point out the necessary inter-
dependence of the two approaches and indeed their co-presence in Western thought, a task that
begins with an analysis of Arendt.
9 Boman, op. cit .• p. 201. Sec also Bruno Snell, TI,e Discovery of ti,e Milld, New York, Harper, 1%0,
in particular chapter 1.
'0 Boman ibid.
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in the intimate relationship that the Greeks perceived between
geometry and metaphysics.
An early comparison of the advantages of seeing and hearing
occurs in Heraclitus' characteristically fragmentary pronouncement
that "the eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears".l1 His
intention here seems obvious enough, but we should be careful
about too quickly eliding his evaluation of sensual modalities with
his assessment of their epistemological value. Heraclitus also
warned that "eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men having rude
sOUIS",12 and elsewhere repeatedly pointed to hearing as the channel
through which one might gain access to reason.13 Presumably then,
Heraclitus did not assume that one could simply translate sight's
sensual superiority into its superiority as a metaphor for thinking or
knowing.
In his early and brief treatment of the senses, Aristotle similarly
distinguishes between what might be superior in the way of sensual
access to the world and what superior in the mental realm. Thus, he
writes that, "seeing, regarded as a supply for the primary wants of
life, and in its direct effects, is the superior sense; but for developing
intelligence, and in its indirect consequences, hearing takes the
precedence" .14 He goes on to elaborate that it is because seeing
encompasses multiple dimensions of data (colour, figure, size,
motion, number) that it is the more useful of the two for the
necessities of life. However, "it is hearing that contributes most to
the growth of intelligence", principally because learning is a result
of rational discourse, which comes through sound. Yet, in a strange
turn, he then says that discourse is in fact only indirectly audible,
because its basic elements are words, and words are thought-
symbols. He concludes the discussion with the verdict that, "of
II Fragment 15. Translations and numbering are from Tire Fragmellts of/Ire Work of Heraclitus of
Epheslls 011 Nature, translated from the Greek text of Bywater by G.T.W. Patrick, Baltimore: N.
Murray, 1889.
12 Fragment 4.
IJ For example, "It is wise for those who hear. not me, but the universal Reason, to confess that
all things are one" (Fragment 1) or "IT)hose who hear and do not understand arc like the deaf.
Of them the proverb says: "Present, they are absent" (Fragment 3)
14 Aristotle, On Sense and tire Sensible, 437a 4, J. I. Beare, trans.
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persons destitute from birth of either sense, the blind are more
intelligent than the deaf and du mb". It is difficult to see how this
conclusion follows from his earlier argument, unless one assumes
that his 'thought symbols' are essentially visual. Indeed, this reading
would be far more in keeping with Aristotle's dominant
understanding of theoria and nous as forms of inner seeing than a
reading that locates thought and understanding in the sphere of
some type of inner ear. Indeed, Aristotle begins the Metaphysics not
only by drawing an analogy between the desire to know and the
pleasure in visual perception, but also by distinguishing sight as
that sense which provides the most knowledge and the highest
degree of differentiation. ls
This slippage in Aristotle's argument points to the fissure in
sight's epistemological dominance. On the one hand, the processes
of knowing or the object of knowledge (truth) both seem to be
unequivocally visual in the Greek. Yet, the sensual status of
language, which is the principle mode through which we come to
know the world, is far more ambiguous. Language can be conceived
in either modality. This essential ambivalence is evident in Plato,
who distinguishes between the oral (and for Plato the original)
dimension of language, "talking things through", and "written
discourse [which] may be fairly called a kind of image".16 The more
elemental form of language is then the one that comes to us as
sound, whereas the derivative representation in writing is only a
copy, feigning language. Like a painting, "silent as a sanctuary" it is
frozen in a single form, barren and only able to say the same one
thing, and this forever. By contrast speech is living and fertile,
always ready to be planted in different listeners where it might
grow out into the infinite narratives that they create into the future.
Yet, when it comes to thinking, which Plato calls that soundless
""All men by nature d"sire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses;
for even apart from their usefulness they arc loved for themselves; and above all others the
sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we arc not going to do
anything. we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything clse. The reason is that this, most of all
the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things." The
Metaphysics, Book A (I) 98(}o>.
,. The relevant section is from the 1'1Iaedrus, 275d-277a.
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dialogue I have with myself, the inner discourse once again seems to
resolve to an object of vision, this time inner vision. This image,
unlike the written word, is neither enlivened through (audible)
speech, nor entombed in the (silent) written word image. As the
most perfect medium of knowledge, it gives direct access, through
the inner eye, to what is.
So, do we essentially see words, or do we hear them? Is the
linguistically mediated process of thinking modelled on sight or
hearing? The Greek itself is highly ambiguous here. The principle
word for word, A6yo~ (logos) comes from !J:yEW (say), implying the
immediate answer that the word comes to us primarily through the
auditory channel. As Bultmann points out, however, the original
meaning of AtyEffi is not to summon but to explain, where explain
has its root in the concepts of gathering up, selecting, analysing and
estimating. I? Thus, it is not the word in itself, as an event (which
would be heard), that constitutes the knowledge or access to what
is. Rather the word is the gathering place at which 'that which is' is
brought into order and through which reason does its work: "It is
the meaning, not the being spoken, which is constitutive" .18 In
Aristotle's terms, the word one hears would be the thought symbol,
where the thought in itself is accessed through the mind's eye.
Hearing is, as it were, the porter who ought to be dismissed once he
has delivered the good(s). Once the contingency of sound is stripped
away, the mind takes the message and resolves in silence to the
ahistorical and thus intemporallogos, reason.
Things are very different with the Hebrews, who we approach
now where we leave the Greeks, with their word for word, 1:J1 davar.
As with the Greek logos, davar gives us access to how the Hebrews
understood mental life, knowledge and truth; but as we shall see,
the two understandings diverge in significant ways. Starting with
the most well-known biblical reference to the word, that is the word
through which God created the world, we already know that, for the
Hebrews, words in themselves are effective. Thus, like the Greek
17 See Bultmann, "The Word of God in the New Testament", "1'. cit. p. 292 and n. 26.
IS/bid.
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logos, davar derives from the root 'to speak', but in this case the
speech is active and dynamic; it is an activity in which something is
driven forward.
This is perhaps most clearly conveyed by the fact that davar
signifies both word and deed. Thus for the Hebrews, in a manner later
picked up in Austin's concept of the performative, words are acts,
and not merely the names for acts. 19 This coincidence of the word
and the deed begins to convey the distance between the Hebrew
understanding of the word, and our habitual tendency, linked to the
Greek understanding, to think of the word as something distinct
from the deed, to which it refers.
The auditory quality of God's creation, understood not only as a
singular act (in seven days), but as God's ongoing relationship with
the world, is continuous with the Hebrew understanding that
human beings gain access to God (and hence ultimate truth) by
listening to God's words or hearing God's voice.20 Thus, what is
perhaps the central prayer, repeated several times daily and
throughout the liturgy, opens with the words, "Shema Israel",
"Hear Israel!" This, combined with the prohibition on making
images of God and the impossibility of seeing God has led to a
general understanding that, for the Hebrews, the pre-eminent
knowing takes the form of hearing, and not seeing. In this regard, it
is important to understand that the reason one cannot see God is
not, as is frequently thought, because the sight of God would be
overwhelming for a human being, and thus God must hide God's
face to protect human beings. Rather, it is not in God's nature to be
seen.
21 Thus even Moses, the prophet who was most able to
approach God, and who came face to face, panim al panim, with God,
t. J. L Auslin, How to Do Tllings Witl, Words, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1962.
20 In fact. dOllar (word) and kol (voice), are manifested in different ways, representing different
dimensions of God, but I do not explore this here.
. 21 The unsee-able as distinct from the illusive quality of God is powerfully conveyed in one of
the wondrous tales of Rab Nachman of Bratslav which follows the journey of the emissary of a
King who wishes to find that one King of whom he docs not have a portrait. The story is far too
complex to retell interpret here, but one of its implications is that the King behind the screen
(God) cannot be visually represented, even when the screen in pulled back. See "The King and
the Wise man" in Nahma., ofBrotslal'; TI,e Tales, Translated by Arnold J. Band, New York,
Mahwah: PaulistPress, 1978.
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was not permitted to see God, but did hear God's extended speech
and God's name, which he then conveyed to the people as the
means of constituting them into a nation.22
It would be wrong, however, to conclude from this emphasis on
the auditory path to truth that the metaphor of seeing is absent from
Hebrew expression or understanding. Thus, in Moses' final speech
to the people, just before he dies, we see an example of the use of
ra'ah, see, understood as a form of deep knowing. He begins the last
section of his address, the section containing the famous phrase,
"Choose Life!", with the words, "See, I set before you this day life
and prosperity, death and adversity" (Deut. 30.15). Still, we should
read the references to seeing with caution. Moses' call is not to bring
sight to the contemplation of forms, but rather to the acts through
which God speaks. Similarly, Boman points out that even where
Jews do (contrary to the prohibition) create visual representations of
God or the events of the Torah, these are symbols of God's action
and word, for example either the scrolls, or God's hand, which
symbolises action, or the acts of people through which God speaks.23
In this sense, to the extent that the modality of vision is recognised
as an access to what is essential, it is not the image that we are asked
to see, but the word or the act. Indeed, immediately after the verse,
"And all the people saw the voice" (Ex. 20.14), comes the prohibition
on making images.
Finally, and to complete this cursory comparison with the Greek,
the notion of truth, or what one seeks through knowledge, has a
very distinct meaning in Hebrew. Here it is not related (as in the
Greek) to the notion of what is (or the verb to be), but rather to
faithfulness, trustworthiness, conformity with experience. So, for
example, 'emeth, the word stated at the end of various prayers, does
not, as in the Greek, convey the idea that something has been
revealed, but rather fidelity to what we know. 24 If one starts from
22 The idea of the nation, being a modem phenomenon, did not of course exist. However,
referencing the constituted body as "Israel" causes even more confusion!
23 Boman, "p. cit., p. 113. The discussion here is of the cases in which Jews do, contrary to the
prohibition, create visual representations of God or the events of the Torah.
2. Boman, "p. cit., p. 202.
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the perspective of the Greek worldview, detaching the idea of truth
from what is (in itself) makes no sense, and removes all objectivity
from knowledge. If, however, one suspends judgment as to the
proper or essential nature of knowing or truth and allows these two
different modalities to unfold, what transpires is that the world
revealed through the Hebrews' knowing was, in certain categorical
respects, a different world. More precisely, the ontological status of
that which we seek to know and ourselves as knowers is
importantly different in the two cases. In the Greek framework, the
known and the knower begin as distinct bits of being which are then
brought into relationship, where that relationship entails more or
less accurate understanding. In the Hebrew, the relationship
precedes the abstraction of things in themselves.25
The world our senses bring us to
Jonas begins his phenomenological analysis of seeing and hearing as
I have here, by observing vision's dominance as a model for
thinking, beginning with the Greeks and persisting through the life
course of Western philosophy. He then sets out to elucidate the
particular qualities of the distinct world that sight gives us,
contrasting it in particular with the heard world.26 First is sight's
capacity to give the perceiver access to "a contemporaneous
manifold", or many objects of perception at the same time. Second is
sight's abstraction of the object from a causal relation with the
perceiver, and its isolation of the object as a thing in itself. Third is
the way in which sight establishes a distance between the object and
the perceiver. In elaborating these differences, Jonas' clear objective
is to point to what it is about sight that makes it superior and to the
25 One might note here the resonances with Heideggcr's thought. Thai Ileidcgger's work seems
more in keeping with the Ilebrew framework has been explored by Marlene Zaredcr in Tile
Ullthol/ghl Debt; Heidegga alld tire I /ebraic Heritage, translated by Bellina Bergo, California:
Stanford University Press, 2006.
2. Jonas also considers touch and. in an appendix, movement. but I do not discuss them here.
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deficiency of a heard world. In re-presenting them here, we might
call that hierarchy into question.
Only sight, Jonas argues, gives us access to "many things
juxtaposed, as co-existent parts" in a single horizon at the same
time. In the other senses, he claims, a single moment gives us access
only to one undifferentiated experience, and to gain access to many
'parts', say notes, one has to extend the experience over time. Thus,
in hearing, "any present quality is just a point in a passage of
transition ... the content is never present as a whole, but always in
the making, always partial and incomplete".27 Sound, admittedly,
may contain several elements simultaneously, as for example when
an orchestra produces music, but the integrity of the distinct
elements is lost, whereas when we see many objects at once, we still
see them as discrete objects.
The most important result of this distinguishing quality of sight,
he argues, is the way in which it alone produces the experience of
the present "as something more than the point experience of the
passing now.,,2R It does this by virtue of the fact that whereas time is
built into the content of sound (the melody for example is the
sequence), the content of what one sees (for example, the colour of
an object) is not in itself effected by how long is lasts. It is
independent of temporality.
There is a great deal going on in this single distinguishing
'advantage', principally the way in which sight presents us with
discrete objects and vision's distinct way of producing temporality. I
will come back to the issue of the discrete object in the discussion of
the second of Jonas' advantages, but for now, pause to reflect on his
analysis of temporality. A full discussion of different conceptions of
time is well beyond what is possible here, so this exploration will be
limited to two observations: first concerning the assumptions built
into Jonas' analysis about the temporal nature of being and the
relative roles that time and space have in the essential beingness of
the world, and second, concerning the question of the'distinct now'.
27 Jonas. "'The Nobility of Sight", op. cit., p. 136.
'" Ibid. p. 144.
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Although he does not make this explicit, it is evident from Jonas'
discussion of the special access that this frozen present gives us that
he understands being in essentially static and spatial terms. This, as
Boman points out, is in keeping with the Greek's predominantly
spatial conception of reality, where being is essentially located in
space, and temporality is added as a qualification or attribute of
being. This ordering is not only alien to the Hebrew experience, but
in fact negated by the forms of the Hebrew words for to be, which
always also imply becoming (as well as effecting).
Thus, as Bergson most famously observed, time (as represented
by Jonas) is conceptualised as a mobile image of immobile eternity.
In other words, we assume that what is most essential to being is
being as it would be in immobile eternity, a timeless place we
discover with our minds eye. We then judge time's movement as the
passage of discrete moments of being, removed from its essence into
time. Were we to start with time, as Bergson does, being would
always already be in time, essentially in flow. Boman, in linking
hearing with this temporal priority and seeing with the spatial
priority, would agree with Plato's observation that the senses other
than sight, and in particular hearing, are the senses not of being but
of becoming. Standing with the Hebrews, however, this does not
imply that hearing merely gives them access to an unstable and thus
difficult to understand being, or, in Jonas's terms, deprives them of
the distinction between change and the unchanging or becoming
and being. Rather, it is through the aural construction of temporality
as flow that one gains access to being as it is, always becoming.
Jonas then goes a step further in linking vision with the project of
metaphysics by noting that it is vision's production of being as
essentially static which gives rise to the idea that being's ultimate
truth or unmediated state is to be found in eternity, the place of
absolute timelessness. The problem is that when he suggests this
link, and indeed when Arendt reiterates it, it seems that they are just
reporting things as they are, rather than advocating one of a possible
number of approaches. Completely absent is any critical evaluation
of the implications of this elevation of the eternal in the hierarchy of
being. Yet for Arendt, this is hardly an innocent or neutral turn in
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being's history! Elsewhere she argues that it is this very adulation of
the eternal as being's ultimate state that gives rise to philosophy's
structural incapacity to recognise the sui generis value of activity in
itself and in particular of politics, with its constant becoming.29 As
with the Greeks, then, there would seem to be a fissure in Arendt's
own declared allegiance.
Indeed, it is fascinating that although Arendt never associates her
project of reviving politics with the Hebrews, she argues that to
remedy this metaphysical turn, we need to revalue speech and deed
(davar) as the highest achievements of the human condition. Indeed,
she extends the being of this human activity beyond the frozen
moment, into the narratives that human beings entering the
conversation across time will continue to generate about them. In
this sense, though she uses the Greek polis as her ideal type, what
she describes is far more like a melody played by a continuous
orchestra than it is the manifold data of the seen/scene.
Relatedly, in her discussion of the nunc stans, the distinct moment
of the now, Arendt reads Kafka's nightmarish allegory of the He
standing at the point of embattled engagement between the past and
the future to suggest that it is only the insertion of the man (He) that
transforms what would otherwise be a Bergsonian continuous flow
into time as we know it. 30 In fact, it is only through the activity of
thinking that the tenses, past, present and future, come to be emptied
of content and constituted as such.31 It is, she argues, the dream of
metaphysics, and not the primary experience of being, which places
us outside this seamless movement, sitting on high like an umpire of
a game which could in fact not possibly be going on were we not
down there on the court. Arendt's point is not to invalidate this
metaphysical perspective, but rather to make explicit that it is a
perspective, and not the only one. Indeed, it is one whose very
29 Sec in particular the Human Conditions, op cit. p. 20 and Lee/ures Oil Kant's Political Philosophy,
ed. Ronald Beiner, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 24.
)() Arendt, "Thinking", op. cit. p. 203ft.
31 Boman in fact argues that for the Hebrews, time as such, understood as an empty form has no
meaning, rather "the Semitic concept of time is closely coincident with that of its content
without which time would be quite impossible." tbid. p. 139.
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existence rests on the existence of another. Thus, one might agree
with Jonas that sight is superior as the medium through which
metaphysics is constructed, but question the equation between
metaphysics and a correct understanding of the world. Indeed, if the
metaphysical position emerges only by abstracting from one/s initial
location as an actor in the scene of being, its claim to unmediated
truth rests on the prior existence of contingent historicised
experience and denial of that existence. It was perhaps Kafka's
inability to abstract himself from the clamour of voices then, or his
unwillingness to abandon their immediacy for the metaphysical
heights, that explains, in part, his darkened vision, or, if Benjamin
was right (as in the citation at the beginning of this article), his not
seeing at all: "Kafka listened to tradition, and he who listens hard,
does not see."32
Returning now to the question of the constitution of objects, one
already sees in this first dimension of comparison that for Jonas one
dimension of vision's superiority is that it distinguishes objects as
discrete and static entities, understood as substantial bits of being.
Sound, by contrast does not provide"object referents" as such, nor
lead us to "existents ... enduring things beyond the sound events
themselves". In sound, the boundaries are lost. When one reads
Jonas' rebuke of sound's transgressive tendencies, one could almost
think one had mistakenly switched books from a phenomenology of
the senses to a liberal tirade against pre-modern collectivism:
"[T]here is no "keeping to one's place" in the community of acoustic
individuals", he complains, "[T]he simple fact is that sounds are
dynamic events, not just static qualities, and thus trespassers by
nature."33 What Jonas fails to notice about his own judgment is that
the very concept of trespass assumes that beings' essential being
inheres within the boundaries of their form, and this has not yet
been established. This incursion into each other's "space" is
mirrored in sound's incursion on the hearing subject who cannot
stand apart, but is, as it were, at sound/s mercy. This, of course, is
"Walter Benjamin, "Reflections on Kafka", in Illuminations, Henry Zorn, trans. New York:
Schocken Books, 1963, p. 143.
33 ibid. p. 139
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the complete opposite to the case of seeing, where the subject is the
master of the object he chooses to see.
Indeed, the relationships that seeing and hearing establish
between the knower and the known differ along a number of
dimensions. First, Jonas contends that when one sees an object, there
is no causal connection, and indeed no relationship, where
relationship implies that the parties affect each other. 34 When one
looks at an object, "it is apprehended in its self containment from
out of my own self containment". Thus, in sight, there is a
distinction between the thing and the thing as it affects me. As Jonas
puts it, I can carry away in my mind's eye what vision gives me as
essential to the object, its form. Jonas correctly links this distinction
with the distinctions between form and matter and essence and
existence, which we know to be so pivotal to Aristotelian thought
and the substance ontology which flows from it. 35 Moreover,
although Jonas does not make this explicit, the causal disconnection,
or absence of an affective relationship, is also the condition of our
assumption that subject and object are essentially discrete. I only
corne to be as a subject who can observe the world and make sense
of it, if I assume that there is a world there free from my act of
observation, or correlatively, that the activity of observation is
independent of the world observed.36
Interestingly, whereas throughout the discussion Jonas sings only
vision's praises, at this point he sounds a note of caution. The causal
disjunction inherent in vision's construction abstracts objects from
causal sequences, bequeathing us the Humean problem of
establishing causality. What he does not elaborate here, but does
point out elsewhere, is that this absolute separation of subject and
object or experiencing being and subject of experience gives rise to
an objectification of experience, which while advantageous to the
34 Since Schrodiger asked us to imagine his cat, we know this is incorrect, but the point is made
in a Newtonian, not a quantum world.
35 Thus, with Aristotle, it is form that defines the object, giving shape to otherwise formless
mailer; with Kant, transcendental thought forms are abstracted from their particular existence
in the world as mailer.
36 The obvious interlocutor here is mysticism in general and Buddhist philosophy in particular,
where the distinction between subject and object is most thoroughly called into question.
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metaphysical project, may be noxious when imported to other
spheres of concern, such as faith and ethics. For example, for
Heidegger's colIeague Bultmann, whose primary concern is
theological and ethical, this priority for 'seeing knowledge'
effectively undermines the possibility of a transformative
engagement. Thus, he writes that understanding which has the
character of 'seeing', of observing from a distance, ultimately
amounts to exposition of a world at a distance; "the world is an
objective entity for me and I am an object in the world". By contrast,
understanding that has the character of 'hearing', of knowing
oneself to be summoned, "discloses the possibility of my existence
which I must resolutely grasp, and so teaches me to understand
myself anew". H We will return to this in the final section.
The second way in which Jonas argues seeing and hearing
establish a different relationship between the knower and the
known concerns the power relationship between them. Thus, the
causal relationship which Jonas attributes to sound is one in which I
am not merely affected, but as it were the victim, invaded by sound,
and thus passive, unfree. This stands in stark contrast to the seeing
subject, who might choose to rest her eyes where she wishes, or
even to use her eyelids to block out objects altogether. Jonas
provides a host of highly loaded descriptions of this disempowered
state: the subject is "outside his control", "exposed", "has no choice
in the matter", "at the mercy of environmental action" which
"intrudes upon his sensibility without his asking" and"decides for
him." Arendt even speculates that the resemblance (or perhaps even
the etymological relationship) between the German hdren (to hear)
and a cluster of words associated with obedience and bondage may
be explained by this deeper quality of hearing as a state in which
one is dominated.38 From a philological point of view Arendt is
probably on shaky ground on this point, but her analysis is
"Bultmann. "Church and Teaching in the New Testamenf', in Failh and Underslatllti"g, o/,. cil.,
pp.191-2.
3R The words she lists are "xd,6nhm, It6rig, 8ehiiren" meaning to obey, be in bondage, belong.
The last, to belong has a very different resonance and is indeed far closer to the s('ns(' of tru th as
fidelity discussed here. Cf. The Life vf Ihe Mind; 17,inking, ibid. p. 112.
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continuous with a more general preoccupation in her work with
which type of knowledge or ideas are conducive to human freedom,
and which threaten it. More specifically, one sees in her
interpretation of a putative link between hearing and obedience
intimations of her thoughts about the danger that 'the Absolute' in
general, and God in particular, pose for human freedom and
politics.
For Arendt, the greatest threat to human freedom is that humans
will not identify their own contingent worldly sphere and their own
embodied conversations as the ultimate site in which they must
make meaning and generate principles for how to live. Rather, they
will see it as subordinated to a voice which commands from beyond
what can be seen between men; an Absolute which cannot be
interrogated and which is not permeable to compromises, but can
only be obeyed.39 The Absolute may take the form of a
heteronymous being or principle which stands outside or above, or
the murmur from the private darkness of the heart, but in either
case, to the extent that a person answers to it, she sacrifices her
status as a fully autonomous member of an autonomous human
community. The problem here is that Arendt elides obedience, the
Absolute and the loss of autonomy, thus missing the quite different
understanding of those terms as conveyed, for example in
Bultmann's writings on the nature of the word of God.40 In this, her
work suffers a not unusual (and not surprising) failure of
philosophy to grasp the theological proposition that one could be
freely obedient to the call of the Absolute. Given the immense
difficulty that this challenge to our accepted understandings of
freedom and the Absolute poses, I leave it to the side and simply
suggest here that philosophers' failure to grasp the alternative logic
suggested by the theologians may lie in part in the fact that they
39 She lells a powerful story of the dangers of the call of the Absolute, nol only in the forms of
which we might be suspicious, like vengeance, but even of love and compassion in On
Revolution, Penguin Books, 1990, see in particular chapter 2.
,oSee for example "What does it Mean to Speak of God?" in Fait" and Understanding, op. cit., p.
61ff.
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interpret the auditory relationship through the ontology of distinct
and bounded entities which sight and not sound produces.
Coming back to Arendt, what is odd, and what gives rise to a
sense of ambivalence in her narratives, is that while she associates
the modality of hearing with the relationship of obedience, it is
precisely through a relationship which takes place through hearing,
that is the relationship of spoken discourse, that she envisages
human beings establishing the conditions of autonomy. Thus, she
argues that human freedom is not (as per the classical liberal
conception) impeded by other people, but only arises under
conditions of plurality. It is when we speak with each other that we
bring into existence the in between space which she calls inter-est;
and it is in this space that we can experience ourselves as free. This
freedom, however, is not the freedom of mastery, for the meaning of
our words will always remain open ended and continue to be
created by those who hear us.
At the same time, her conception of the Absolute as something
which stands over and above human beings as a frozen rule or
principle bears a significant resemblance to the Hebrew's conception
of the idol, or for that matter Plato's frozen image - a visual
phenomenon. In oth~r words, Arendt consciously assumes the
priority of the visual as the superior modality of thought, but what
her own texts speak of is an auditory path to a form of knowledge
far more compatible with freedom. Thus, as she herself notes,
metaphysics may be appropriate for certain forms of knowing or
certain ways of being human, specifically the vita contempliva, but
positively hostile to others, specifically the life of politics. While she
does not link this latter argument with the modalities of seeing and
hearing, the associations drawn here indicate that her own work
would suggest that in her search for an engaged model of thinking,
she might well adopt the metaphor of hearing. Finally, the reason
this will be such a problem for Arendt, particularly in this last work
The Life of the Mind, is that she is looking to build a bridge from
thinking in itself, the modality of the vita contempliva to ethical
action, which she has argued emerges from the multi-vocality of
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politics. This then raises the larger question of the relationship
between these two modes of reception and ethics.
Coming back to Jonas' analysis, on which Arendt based hers, one
sees clear marks of the Greek conception of reality which Jonas uses
as his compass of evaluation in the way he frames both of these
dimensions of sight's special qualities. Had he begun his project
with the proximity to the Hebrew texts and traditions that he clearly
has with the Greek, his analysis may have had quite another tone.
The affinity between Jonas' ideal world and that of the Greeks
becomes obvious in the light of Boman's summary: "They [the
Greeks] consider reality an objective, given quality with which our
senses, particularly sight, bring us into contact."41 Accordingly, we
know it best when we can stand at a distance from it and observe it
the way it is, free of us as we are free of it. By contrast, for the
Hebrews, being is understood always as affecting or as experienced.
Even at the linguistic level there is no designation for things as they
are, but always things as they affect us or as we are affected by
them. Hence for example, the heavenly bodies are lamps T11N?)
(me'oroth), or lights, C,.,'N orim, which are not names of an entity out
there, but of some happening which we know through its effects on
us. The idea that it is "the sun" which then does this thing of shining
or warming is already one step removed from the Hebrew linguistic
experience; it abstracts and reifies the abstraction, a Greek
translation! Boman calls this psychological as distinct from logical
thinking. In doing so, however, he emphasises that this is not the
same as mere subjectivism, a likely conflation if one takes the logical
as the correct relationship with reality.
In the same vein, Hebrew expressions translated as boundaries or
borders do not designate a dividing line between two distinct
entities, given by the natural boundaries of those entities
themselves. Rather, the boundary is always a specific part of reality
in itself, say a mountain or the ocean.42 Thus, boundaries are not
assumed to arise from the essential nature of an entity's being (as
<t Boman 01'. cit., p.l13.
42 0. Boman, p. 157ff.
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bounded}, but as human constructions set up to order the world in a
particular manner. Similarly, there is no distinction in the Hebrew
language between form and content, just like, as Jonas remarked,
the melody is the form of the musical notes.43
Synaesthesia
Daniel Barenboim, the world renowned Argentinean-born Israeli
conductor entitled his 2006 Reith Lectures, In the Beginning was the
Sound, thus providing his own variation on St John's beginning in
the word and Goethe's in the deed. 44 In contradistinction to Arendt,
who relegates Aristotle's remark on hearing's special relationship to
our intellectual functions to a footnote and Jonas who mentions it
not at all, Barenboim gives it pride of place, paraphrasing Aristotle
to have him say that "the eyes are the organs of temptation, and the
ears are the organs of instruction".45 It is hardly surprising that
Barenboim, a man who has lived his life in music, should reverse
this hierarchy to privilege sound. Nevertheless, given the
epistemological inheritance and everyday pursuits of our other
commentators, his perspective might provide some balance.
Inverting Jonas' question, Barenboim asks why it is that sound
occupies this special position. His first answer takes us directly to
the intimate relationship between hearing and time noted here
already on several occasions, but on this occasion we arrive there via
a different route. Sound, Barneboim tells us, has a uniquely
powerful relationship with recollection and memory. This implies
not only that sound takes us across time, but that time itself alters in
the moment of recollection; when one is remembering or
recollecting, the past and the present are not distributed along a
unidirectional line, but occur as undifferentiated experience.
43 Jones ibid. p. 156.
44 As Buman points out when Goethe wrote that "In the beginning was the deed", he was in
tact, perhaps unbeknownst to him, accurately portraying the essential ambivalence of davar as
both word and act.
45 The transcript and importantly the audio arc available on the BBC website at
http:f / www.bbc.co.uk/radi04/rcith2006/lecture2.shtml, accessed 15 September 2006.
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Perhaps this is why, even today, Jews access the stories told in the
Torah, events they are enjoined to recollect and re-experience, by
listening to them being sung, and not by looking at words (let alone
.) 46pictures on a page.
Sound's second special quality, Barenboim tells us, this time
drawing on contemporary neurobiology, is that the auditory system
is physically much closer to the parts of the brain which regulate
life, that is, those brain centres from which the basic emotions
emerge. This proximity to affect is accentuated by the intimacy of
sound's effect. Thus, providing a physiological analogue to Jonas'
point about sound's direct impact on the listener, Barenboim notes
that "the physical vibrations which result in sound sensations are a
variation on touching, they change our own bodies directly and
deeply". In other words, sound both affects us and effects us in
ways which bypass other cognitive functions. Hearing is the single,
unbroken movement of a vibration from 'the outside' to 'the inside':
from your fingers to the strings of a piano altering the wave patterns
of the molecules in the atmosphere and then vibrating in my
eardrum. From the point of view of the eye, these are distinct bits of
being (fingers, strings, air, ears); for sound, there is simply a single
continuous vibration.
If one's project is to create distance and objectivity, this is of
course a non-ideal arrangement; even more so, if one's project is to
ensure that the human subject can stand over above the world as his
object. Indeed, if one starts with vision's reality, where the parts of
the sequence are distinct objects, and one reads the direction of
power from the sequence of time, one must conclude with Jonas and
Arendt that the listener is at the mercy of those fingers playing that
piano. Things become even worse, from this perspective, when one
adds Barenboim's point that the effect moves directly to the most
basic of emotions, the seat of mere life which Arendt associated with
the deprivation of human freedom.47
46 The clearest example of this is from the Passover Haggadah which states, "In each and every
generation every person must regard himself as though he had come forth from Egypt as a
slave."
47 0. nre Hllman Conditions, op. cit., pp. 96-101.
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Arendt certainly has a point, if one thinks (as she no doubt did)
of the power that Wagner's music had to induce uncritical allegiance
amongst listeners when harnessed to a violent collectivist political
ideology. One can well comprehend why resisting what Arendt
called the voice of the Absolute became imperative for her and
Jonas, both not only German Jewish refugees but also students of
Heidegger.48 From where they wrote, it makes perfect sense that the
priority had to be to insist on establishing philosophical, political
and even aesthetic conditions under which the individual was best
placed to stand at a distance and choose which parts of her
environment would act upon her. For us to reconstruct an ideal of
some type of Romantic dissolution of the self, abstracted from the
historical itinerary of earlier Romanticism, and thus from the context
of their theorising, would be both politically na'ive and amnesic.
However, as Jonas points out in a paper addressed not to
philosophers, but to theologians, an historically justifiable
preference neither trumps all other claims, nor annuls the perhaps
unintended consequences of choosing this approach. Philo's
conversion of ears into eyes and his putative elevation of the faithful
from God's listeners to God's spectators fundamentally altered our
understanding of the nature of God, as the Hebrews, who
prohibited all images, well knew it would. As Jonas puts it, this shift
effects a turn from "the original hearing of the living, nonworldly
God ... to the theoretical will for vision of the supernatural, divine
truths" .49 God seen is God objectified, and after this transition, faith
must answer to theoria or philosophy. It is no coincidence that the
Greek translation of Israel, is one who sees God. Indeed, it was Philo,
the Greek Jew who is cited as the source of this interpretation, one
he seems to have drawn by linking the Hebrew Israel with the
similarly sounded ish ro-eh el, a person who sees God. But this
etymological interpretation is absent from all Jewish commentary,
4' I have omitted entirely from this discussion the turn in th,' later Ileidegger to speak of the
conditions for the possibility of being as 'a call'. This is discussed in Derrida, GJS/'irit: /-Ieidegger
lind tile QlIestion, translated by Geoffrey Bennington and l~achel Bowlby, Chicago: university of
Chicago Press, 1989.
49 Heidegger and Theology, in n,e Pilel/omenon oj !.iJe, o/,. cit. p. 239.
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which takes the etymology to rder back to sarita (you have
struggled), recalling that Jacob was bequeathed the name Israel after
he had spent the night wrestling the angel. 50 The important point for
us is not whether the true etymology lies in seeing or wrestling, bu t
rather that the Greek translation assumes the former and the Jewish
tradition recognises only the latter. As various scholars of biblical
exegesis have noted, when biblical interpreters make etymological
claims, they are not tracking an accurate philological aetiology of the
words 'as they are', but "trying to understand the text from the
perspective of their own time and place" .51
The result of this translation, or transformation of ears into eyes
and God into an object of contemplation, is evident in Arendt's
understanding of God's place in political life. As noted above, for
Arendt, God, like all other Absolutes, is fundamentally inimical to
the autonomous project which politics ought to be, and indeed as
soon as God comes in, politics is over. If one understands God as
some type of super-substance, this is no doubt a legitimate concern.
Indeed, the observation perhaps tells us a great deal about how the
people who currently justify thick moral absolutes and violence in
theological terms (as God's commands), understand their God and
their freedom. This understanding has, however, already gone
through the conversion that the Hebrews forbade - indeed a
conversion that is also called idolatry.
Constituted as we are, reversing this conversion presents a near
incomprehensible project, especially as appreciating its value almost
requires that we have already moved some way towards it. Yet it
was this return to the call which Levinas, another Jewish refugee
and student of Heidegger, believed was the antidote to the radical
violation of human dignity which they had all experienced. For
Levinas, in contradistinction to Arendt, what was needed was not to
50 The relevant verse here is Gen. 32:29. There is a significant debate in Philo scholarship about
the sources of his etymological interpretation, which is so unique in the Jewish tradition. This
debate includes a significant question mark over whether he read more than a little Hebrew at
all. No doubt, he was using the Greek text. See Birnbaum. Ellen, 'tne Place of Judaism ill Pllilo's
nlOugllt, 1996: Brown University.
51 Birnbaum, 01'. cit. p. 69.
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recover politics from where it had been relegated under the rule of
metaphysics, but rather to recover ethics from where it had been
relegated. And for Levinas, this entailed reminding us of the ethical
relationship in which the constitution of the subject does not
logically precede her openness to the other, or, in Levinas' terms,
placing ethics before ontology.52
Abstracting from the enormous complexity compacted into his
project, the relevant part of Levinas' argument for our purposes is
that if we assume that what comes first are beings as fully formed
bits of being who arise for each other as objects of contemplation,
ethics will always be a problem. As Jonas put it, when I look at an
object, including another person, "it is apprehended in its self
containment from out of my own self containment", and respecting
my freedom entails allowing me to decide how I will treat that
object and if I have any obligation towards it. The visual
relationship with the object is, on this model, ideal, because I can
always exercise my freedom by blocking it from my view. If,
however, the other comes to me as a call, as a resonance, I am
already implicated, touched by sound. The implication, which
Levinas announces loud and clear, is that we are always and already
responsible for the other.
The ethical infinity of Levinas' call is of course troubling to our
conception of freedom, but this is just his point. Just as Arendt
pointed out that the metaphysical priority for eternal forms
undercuts our ability to grasp the sui generis value of historical
engagement with other people, so too Levinas is pointing out that its
schematisation of the world as an object of contemplation removes
us from our being-as-implicated in the lives of others.
In both cases, what is really fascinating about these two Jewish
writers, whose concepts were so powerfully hewn through the
apparatus philosophy, is that the path they suggest is neither visual
nor auditory, but synaesthetic. In Arendt's case, she writes of life in
the polis, where one sees and is seen as one acts with the spoken
"The themes discussed here are most fully developed in Totality and Infinity. translated by
Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1%9.
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word. In Levinas's case, it is the call of the face that breaks the
domination of a metaphysical conception of the other as my object.
Perhaps what both were trying to achieve was that allusive manner
of being in which two subjects can exist and know each other to
exist simultaneously, haunted as they are on the one side by the
danger of collapsing into undifferentiated symbiosis and on the
other of experiencing each other only as limits on their own
freedom. To stave off the first danger, they draw on vision's
capacity to create distance; to avert the second, they draw on
hearing's capacity to remind us that this distance is a visual illusion.
How one embodies or institutionalises the synaesthetic ethic is
the next challenge, but one for which Barenboim gives us a working
model in his final two lectures, delivered respectively at Ramallah
and Jerusalem. In those two cities we have a political and social
reality where the very problem I have discussed in the abstract is
lived experience. On the one side, the dignity of both parties is
threatened by the remoteness of distance; each has become the
object of the other in the worst possible sense and as an object, is
always expendable. On the other, that same dignity is threatened by
the possibility of fusion; either might have its identity and
particularity overwhelmed by the other, should the force of the
other's voice (or weapons or numbers) become greater. Barenboim's
response to this deadly choice, developed collaboratively with
Edward Said, the Palestinian philosopher and musician, was to
create an orchestra comprising young Arab and Israeli musicians,
the West-east Divan. Neither would be so narve as to suggest that an
orchestra could be a panacea. Perhaps though, the metaphor of an
audience watching an orchestra, where distinct bodies with distinct
political and cultural histories create new pieces of music whose
existence rests on their commonality and difference offers us a new
ethical aesthetics.
Literature & Aesthetics 16(2) December 2006, page 144
